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THE RIGHT OF AN ACCUSED TO OBTAIN PRE-TRIAL
INSPECTION OF HIS CONFESSION
Trial courts have rather consistently refused
to compel the prosecution to permit pre-trial
examination by defense counsel of confessions
allegedly made by the accused. This refusal has
had its basis in the early common law practice
of uniformly denying a defendant access to any
of the prosecution's evidence.' Although inroads
have been made into this attitude in other areas
of discovery,2 the view has generally prevailed
that the accused is not entitled to an inspection
of his alleged confession. 3 Moreover, legislation
I The earliest leading caseisRex v. Holland, 4 T. R.
691, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (1792). It was said that no
principle or precedent warranted discovery, and if
such were permitted, it would subvert the whole
system of criminal law. It was also thought that
discovery in a criminal case would lead to tampering
with the documents and perjury by the defendant.
For jurisdictions that have adopted this common
law attitude see 6 WiGozo, EVIDENCE § 1859 (g)
(3d ed. 1940); Comment, 60 YALE L. J. 626 (1951);
Note, 53 CoLum. L. REV. 1161 (1953).
2 The defendant has been permitted to examine
grand jury minutes. United States v. Kaskd, 18
F.R.D. 477 (E.D.N.Y. 1956), and People v.
Brundage, 147 N.Y.S.2d 45 (1955). Inspection has
been granted of witnesses' statements. Fryer to.
United States, 207 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U. S. 885 (1953); Drozewski v. State, 84 So.2d
329 (Fla. 1955).
3 State v. Kupis, 37 Del. (7 W. W. Harr.) 27, 179
concerning pre-trial examination generally has
been narrowly construed in favor of the prose-
cution. Recent cases, however, appear to fore-
cast a more liberal attitude towards such dis-
closure.
The problems involved in the discovery of
statements and confessions vary according to
whether such discovery is governed by the
common law, state legislation, or by the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure. 4
INSPECTION IN THE ABSENCE OF STATUTE
It is generally assumed that, in the absence
of statute, a defendant is not entitled as of
Atl. 640 (1935); People v. Parisi, 270 Mich. 429,
259 N.W. 127 (1935); Territory v. McFarlane,
7 N.M. 421, 37 Pac. 1111 (1894) (inspection of the
defendant's testimony at a preliminary hearing
denied); Pettigrew v. State, 289 S.W.2d 935 (Tex.
1956); Lopez v. State, 158 Tex. Crim. 16, 252 S.W.2d
701, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 893 (1952) (inspection
denied before confession offered into evidence);
Abddl v. Commonwealth, 173 Va. 458, 2 S.E.2d
293 (1939); Brouz v. Commonwealth, 90 Va. 671,
19 S.E. 447 (1894); Steensland et al v. Hoppmann,
213 \Vis. 593, 252 N.W. 146 (1934); Santry v.
State, 67 Wis. 65, 30 N.W. 226 (1886).
4 FED. R. CRim. P., 18 U.S.C. following §3771
(1946).
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right to a pre-trial inspection of his statements. 6
It has been held, however, that a trial court
has the inherent power to require, in its discre-
tion, the production of tangible evidence. 6 But
this power has been rarely used to permit the
inspection of confessions.7 In addition, appellate
courts have generally approved the denial of
such discovery.8 Furthermore, on at least one
occasion an appellate court has reversed the
order granting inspection by a trial court.9
6 Slate v. Kupis, 37 Del. (7 W. W. Harr.) 27,
179 Ad. 640 (1935); People v. Parisi, 270 Mich.
429, 259 N.W. 127 (1935); Territory v. McJarlane,
7 N.M. 421, 37 Pac. 1111 (1894); Pettigrew v. State,
289 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. 1956); Lopez v. State, 158
Tex. Crim. 16, 252 S.W.2d 701, cert. denied, 344
U.S. 893 (1952); Abdell v. Commonwealth, 173 Va.
458, 2 S.E.2d 293 (1939); Brown v. Commonwealth,
90 Va. 671, 19 S.E. 447 (1894); Steensland et al v.
Hoppmann, 213 Wis. 388, 252 N.W. 146 (1934);
Santry v. State, 67 Wis. 65, 30 N.W. 226 (1886);
State v. Leland, 190 Ore. 598, 227 P.2d 785 (1951)
(denial of inspection not prejudicial error).
In Louisiana, however, the defendant was granted
inspection as a matter of constitutional right.
State v. Dorsey, 207 La. 928, 22 So.2d 273 (1945).
But see State v. Lea, 228 La. 724, 84 So.2d 169
(1955); State v. Shourds, 224 La. 955, 71 So.2d
340 (1954).
6 State v. Superior Court of Santa Cruz County,
81 Ariz. 127, 302 P. 2d 263 (1956). People ex rel.
Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84
(1927).
7 See, e.g. Commonwealth v. Chapin, 333 Mass.
610, 132 N.E.2d 404 (1956); Commonwealth v.
Lundin, 326 Mass. 551, 95 N.E.2d 661 (1950);
Commonwealth v. Galvin, 323 Mass. 205, 80 N.E.2d
825 (1948); State v. Echevarria, 38 N.J.Super. 415,
119 A.2d 183 (1955); State v. Cicenia, 6 N.J. 296,
78 A.2d 568 (1951), cert denied, 350 U.S. 925 (1955).
8 See, e.g., Padgett v. State, 64 Fla. 389, 59 So. 946
(1912); State v. Cicenia, 6 N.J. 296, 78 A.2d 568
(1951), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 925 (1955); State v.
Leland, 190 Ore. 598, 227 P.2d 785 (1951); State v.
Clark, 21 Wash.2d 774, 153 P.2d 297 (1944).
9 In the case of State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98
A.2d 881 (1953), the appellate court waived the rule
not to review orders except final judgments and
reviewed the order relating to the defendant's
right to pre-trial discovery. The appellate court
reversed the trial court's granting of inspection.
The defense counsel argued that he was not
appointed until more than two months after the
Appellate courts have justified the denial by
trial courts of confession discovery by imposing
upon the defendant the burden of establishing
the necessity of the discovery sought. This pre-
requisite has taken the form of two basic re-
quirements. 10 First, the defendant must have
had no access or opportunity prior to the trial
to examine the requested documents." Failure
to have taken advantage of prior access has
been held to constitute, in effect, a waiver of
the privilege of inspection.12 Second, the docu-
ments sought must be material to the prepara-
tion of the defense,u and materiality in this
context has been held not to have been estab-
lished by a general allegation that the confes-
sion is needed to prepare an adequate defense.14
accused had been arrested and made statement; to
the police, and these statements were needed for a
psychiatric examination of the accused.
10 InState v. Tine, 13 N.J.203,98 A.2d 881 (1953),
the appellate court reversed the granting of in-
spection because the trial court imposed the burden
upon the state to show how it would be hampered if
pre-trial discovery were granted; the burden was
upon the defendant to show how the document
would be material to his defense.
Some courts have imposed the additional require-
ments that the object sought be evidentiary. See
People v. Santora, 51 Cal.App.2d 707, 125 P.2d 606
(1942) (inspection denied of confidential police
reports which were not admissible in evidence),
People v. Meadows, 108 Cal.App. 67, 291 Pac. 226
(1930); People v. Fuski, 49 Cal.App. 4, 192 Pac.
552 (1920).
11 See People v. Tarantino, 45 Cal.2d 590, 290
P.2d 505 (1955); Drozewski v. State, 84 So.2d 329
(Fla. 1955); Perez v. State, 81 So.2d 201 (Fla. 1955).
Cf. United States v. Scully, 15 F.R.D. 402 (S.D.N.Y.
1954) (dictum). This first requirement assumes that
the defendant has been unable to recollect the
contents of his confession.
12 Perez v. State, 81 So.2d 201 (Fla. 1955); Comn-
monwealth v. McCarter, 385 Pa. 236, 122 A.2d 714
(1956).
3 State v. Superior Court of Santa Cruz County,
81 Ariz. 127, 302 P.2d 263 (1956); People v. Taran-
tino, 45 Cal.2d 590, 290 P.2d 505 (1955).
14 People v. Tarantino, 45 Cal.2d 590, 290 P.2d
505 (1955); Commonwealth v. Chapin, 333 Mass.
610, 132 N.E.2d 404 (1956); Commonwealth v. Lun-
din, 326 Mass. 551, 95 N.E.2d 661 (1950); Common-
wealth v. Galvin, 323 Mass. 205, 80 N.E.2d 825
(1948).
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The defendant must show that pre-trial exam-
ination is required for the preparation of a
specific defense. For example, where the prose-
cution indicated that it intended to use a
confession for the purpose of impeaching the
defendant's testimony, inspection has been per-
mitted.1" If the confession were alleged to be a
forgery or to be inaccurately recorded, the re-
quirements of materiality should be considered
sufficiently satisfied to warrant discovery.
1 6
In contrast to a majority of jurisdictions, the
Louisiana Supreme Court has held that the
denial of inspection of a defendant's written
statements would deprive him of his constitu-
tional rights to a fair trial.17 However, recent
Louisiana cases have narrowly construed and
severely restricted the application of that
right.18 Nevertheless, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit has suggested
that, in a jurisdiction which allows the court to
decide before trial the question of the volun-
tariness of the confession, denial of inspection
may violate the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. The court maintained
that the truth and accuracy of the statements
contained in an alleged confession are significant
in determining the question of voluntariness. If
15 State v. Superior Court ()f Santa Crz Coutly,
81 Ariz. 127, 302 P.2d 263 (1956).
16 See Slate v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 234, 98 A.2d
881, 897 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
17 State v. Dorsey, 207 La. 928, 22 So.2d 273 (1945).
IsThe Louisiana Supreme Court refused to grant
inspection of transcripts of an oral confession and
limited the Dorsey rule to its facts in Slate v. Lea,
228 La. 724, 84 So.2d 169 (1955); State v. Shourd.
224 La. 995, 71 So.2d 340 (1954).
19 In Application of Tune, 230 F.2d 883 (3d
Cir. 1956), cerl. denied, 349 U.S. 907 (1955), the
defense counsel sought to inspect the defendant's
confession alleging that it was needed for an essential
psychiatric examination of the defendant. The
state submitted affidavits to the defense containing
pertinent parts of the confession. The trial judge
authorized the defense counsel to retain a
psychiatrist to examine the defendant, but held
that, while denial of inspection of a defendant's
confession may not be the better practice, failure
to do so would violate due process only if prejudice
could be shown. Since the state informed the defense
that sodomy and robbery were connected with the
case and did afford psychiatric assistance due
the defense counsel were unable to learn the
contents of the confession before the question
of voluntariness was decided, the court con-
cluded that he would be unable to adequately
argue the question.20 However, the issue of
voluntariness usually involves a consideration
of the circumstances surrounding the taking of
the confession rather than its contents." If, in
deciding this question the court only considers
whether the defendant was subjected to duress
or coercion, the denial of an opportunity for
the defendant to examine his confession should
not be considered a violation of due process.
It is apparent that only in rather unique
situations has a defendant obtained pre-trial
inspection of his confession. The injustice that
may result from this attitude is somewhat
tempered by the fact that the prosecution is
foreclosed from examining the defendant's evi-
dence because of the constitutional mandate
against self-incrimination.n Moreover, if dis-
covery were freely granted, the dangers of
perjury might be increased since it would
create an opportunity for the accused to explain
away whatever admissions he may have made
in his confession.n On the other hand, it is
arguable that a searching cross-examination
process was held not to have been denied. The
court inferred that in other cases the practice of
allowing the judge to decide the question of volun-
tariness before trial without granting pre-trial
inspection, might lead to a denial of due process.
20 Even though the jury was to make the ultimate
determination as to whether or not the confession
was true, the court felt that once the trial judge
ruled that th2 confession was voluntary the jury
would be unlikely to think that the statements
therein were false.
21 In the preliminary examination to determine
whether an alleged confession is admissible in
evidence, the only issue before the court is whether
the confession was freely and voluntarily made
without coercion or promise of immunity. See
INBAU & Rmm, LIE DETEcTION AX\D CRrANAL.
LTERRGOGATiox 198 (3d ed. 1953); McCopmcx,
The Scope of Privilege in the law of Evidence, 16
TEXAs L. Rxv. 447 (1938). Cf. People v. Fudge,
342 1l. 574, 587, 174 N.E. 875. 880 (1931).
22U. S. Coxsr. amend. V. 6 VIGMORE, Evi-
DENCE §1859 (g) (3d ed. 1940).
-3 6 \VIGMORE, EvmENcE §1845 (3d ed. 1940).
The fear that discovery may lead to tampering with
19571
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would mitigate this danger.24 Furthermore, since
the risks involved to a defendant in a criminal
case greatly out weigh those involved in civil
cases where discovery is freely accorded, 25 in-
spection should be permitted in appropriate
cases.
The determination of an appropriate case
should depend upon the necessity of such exam-
ination for the adequate preparation of the
defense. In addition, such opportunity to in-
spect should be limited by the requirements of
necessity presently adhered to by the courts.
However, these requirements should be em-
ployed as tests for determining when pre-trial
examination will be granted rather than as a
rationale for consistently denying such in-
spection.
INSPECTION UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
In the federal courts discovery in criminal
cases is governed by rules 16 and 17(c) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.20 Rule 16
is the general discovery provision under which
the defendant may inspect and copy requested
documents. Rule 17(c) provides for a subpoena
duces tecum and, in addition, authorizes the
court to require that subpoenaed documents be
produced prior to the trial. Pre-trial discovery
of the defendant's statements has been sought
under both rules 16 and 17(c).
Federal Rule 16. This rule provides, in part,
that a defendant may inspect documents or
tangible objects that may be material to the
preparation of his defense which have been ob-
tained from or which belong to the defendant
if such a request is reasonable.27
the documents sought is no longer present as the de-
fendant will be given a copy of his statement rather
than the original.
24 See, e.g., United States v. Peace, 16 F.R.D.
423, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). See also 5 WiGMoRE,
EvI EcE §§1367-68 (3d ed. 1940).
25 FED. R. Cxv. P. 34, 28 U.S.C. (1946). See
Karlsson v. Wolfson, 18 F.R.D. 474 (D.C. Minn.
1956); Sheffidld Corp. v. George F. Alger Co., 16
F.R.D. 27 (S.D. Ohio 1954); Dulansky v. Iowa &
Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 10 F.R.D. 146 (S.D.
Iowa 1950).
26 18 U.S.C. following § 3771 (1946).
27 Upon motion of a defendant at any time after
the filing of the indictment or information, the
A majority of the federal courts have inter-
preted Rule 16 in such a way that confessions
do not fall within its scope.2 8 Primary signifi-
cance has been given to the words "obtained
from" or "belonging to" the defendant. It
has been held that this language refers to docu-
ments which were in existence prior to the time
that the government obtained possession of
them. A confession or similar statement re-
lated to the police after arrest has been held
not to be a document in existence prior to the
time it was transcribed by the government and
thus not something obtained from or belonging
to the defendant."0
On the other hand, a minority of federal
courts have declared that a statement made
after arrest is, in fact, something obtained
from or belonging to the defendant and, th2re-
fore, subject to discovery under rule 16.31
court may order the attorney for the government
to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or
photograph designated books, papers, documents
or tangible objects, obtained from or belonging to
the defendant or obtained from others by seizure
or by process, upon a showing that the items sought
may be material to the preparation of his defense
and that the request is reasonable. The order shall
specify the time, place, and manner of making the
inspection and of taking the copies or photographs
and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are
just. FED. R. CRmI. P. 16.
2 5Schaffer v. United States, 221 F.2d 17 (5th Cir.
1955) (statements by the defendant after arrest
are not "obtained from" or "belonging to" him);
Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1949);
United States v. Louie Girn Hall, 18 F.R.D. 384
(S.D.N.Y. 1956) (legislative history held to indi-
cate that it does not extend to discovery of state-
ments made by the accused when in custody);
United States v. Gogel, 19 F.R.D. 107 (S.D.N.Y.
1956); United States v. Anthony, 145 F.Supp. 323
(M.D.Pa. 1956); United States v. Pdt:, 18 F.R.D.
394 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); United States v. Kiame, 18
F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); United States v.
Chandler, 7 F.R.D. 365 (D.Mass. 1947), cert. denied,
336 U.S. 918 (1948); United States v. Black, 6 F.R.D.
270 (N.D. Ind. 1946). See Note, 67 HARv. L. REV.
492 (1954).
29 See cases cited note 28 supra.
31 Ibid.
31 In United States v. Peace, 16 F.R.D. 423, 424
(S.D.N.Y. 1954), the court granted pre-trial in-
spection of a defendant's confession under rule 16
[Vol. 48
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These cases represent a liberal construction of
the language of the rule and are in direct con-
flict with the majority view.
A smaller number of federal courts have held
that a written statement signed by the de-
fendant after his arrest is a document "belong-
ing to" the accused just as is a document which
had been prepared by him before arrest.n How-
ever, a paper found in the defendant's posses-
sion before arrest is certainly not something
belonging to him merely because his signature
appears thereon. For this reason, it is difficult
to understand why the failure to place a sig-
nature upon a confession obtained after arrest
prevents the document from being considered
as obtained from or belonging to the defendant.
Moreover, it is the content of the confession
which the defendant seeks to inspect. This has,
in fact, been obtained from the accused.3 How-
ever, the distinction drawn between a signed
and an unsigned statement may indicate that
the courts consider an unsigned statement a
part of the prosecution's "work product" and,
therefore, not subject to discoveryM In United
States v. Singer,35 for example, the court indi-
adopting the dicta in Shores v. United States, 174
F. 2d 838 (8th Cir. 1949). See also United States v.
Klein, 18 F.R.D. 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); United
States v. Schluter, 19 F.R.D. 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
n United States v. Singer, 19 F.R.D. 90 (S.D.N.Y.
1956). Contra, Schaffer v. United States, 221 F.2d
17 (5th Cir. 1955). The District of Columbia court
would permit inspection, prior to trial, of any
written statement signed by the defendant and in
the possession of the prosecution. United States v.
Carter, 15 F.R.D. 367 (D.D.C. 1954).
m Since it is the contents of the confession which
is sought to be inspected, it is arguable that a con-
fession transcribed by the prosecution is not a
tangible object obtained from the accused as is
required by the rule. See note 27 supra. But it is
clear that if the defendant has written the confes-
sion himself the document given to the prosecution
would be a tangible object. To hold that, if the
prosecution has written down what the defendant
has said, the document prepared is not a tangible
object would be unrealistic.
34 See United States v. Singer, 19 F.R.D. 90 (S.D.
N.Y. 1956). Cf. United States v. Pdtz, 18 F.R.D.
394 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
35 United States v. Singer, 19 F.R.D. 90 (S.D.N.Y.
1956).
cated that an unsigned statement made by an
accused after his arrest might be a privileged
document because it constitutes the work
product of the prosecution.
The lawyer's work product has been held to
include such things as his notes, personal beliefs
and mental impressions which he has acquired
while conducting his investigation.-" If a con-
fession were considered part of the prosecution's
work product it would be a document prepared
by the prosecution rather than an object ob-
tained from the defendant, and thus would not
be subject to discovery under rule 16. However,
a confession, by definition, cannot be a part of
the work product since a statement is made up
of what the defendant has said. The function of
a confession as an admission of guilt requires
that it represent the exact language of the con-
fessor; it cannot consist of the personal beliefs
and mental impressions of the prosecution ob-
tained in preparation for trial." Furthermore,
a confession is admissible in evidence. It has
been held that material which is admissible in
evidence is not part of an attorney's work
product.38 In addition, courts have allowed the
defendant to inspect statements made volun-
tarily to the prosecution by witnesses." In that
instance the work product argument would
seem a more rational basis for the denial of dis-
36 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), cert.
denied, 336 U.S. 906 (1949); United States v. Certain
Parcels of Land, 15 F.R.D. 224 (S.D.Cal. 1954).
See Note, 28 TExAs L. Rav. 257 (1949).
-71 See note 36 supra.
8 Ibid.
Even if a confession were to be considered part
of the work product it should not be exempt from
discovery since the rule as finally adopted is silent
on the question of privilege. Because the prelimi-,
nary draft of rule 16 excluded documents that were
privileged it might be inferred that even privileged
documents which met the requirements of the rule
were intended to be subject to discovery. On the
other hand, if privileged documents are not subject
to discovery under rule 16, a confession even if
considered a part of the work product, should not
be excluded as privileged since the work product
is not a common law privilege and only the common
law privileges may be exempt. Cf. Hickman
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
39 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (1946), accords the defendant
in a capital case the right to a list of witnesses to be
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covery than it would when applied to state-
ments of the accused. A confession should
therefore not be excluded from pre-trial dis-
covery on the ground that it is part of the
prosecution's work product; it should be sub-
ject to inspection when the additional require-
ments of rule 16 have been satisfied.
In addition to requiring that the objects
sought be obtained from or belong to the de-
fendant, rule 16 further requires that the items
be material to the preparation of the defense.41
In order to satisfy the requirements of mate-
riality it is not sufficient to allege that the
documents are generally needed to prepare an
adequate defense; the defendant must specifi-
cally indicate how the documents are important
to his case.' For example, if the defense is in-
sanity, it must be shown that the psychiatrist
requires a copy of the confession in order to
make a full and complete diagnosis of the de-
fendant's mental condition.4'
The additional provision of rule 16 which re-
quires that the request for inspection be reason-
able should be satisfied if the defendant cannot
obtain the information by any method other
than pre-trial discovery. The motion, however,
must explicitly state what objects the defense
seeks to inspect; a request to inspect any and
all documents impounded by the government
would be denied.n
Rule 16 should thus be applied so as to compel
pre-trial disclosure of the defendant's con-
fession. Such inspection, however, should be
subject to the enumerated limitations which
are contained in the language of the rule.
Nevertheless, as a result of the strict interpre-
tation placed on rule 16, defense counsel have
resorted to the subpoena provisions of rule 17(c)
in order to inspect statements before trial.
produced at the trial. See Fryer v. United States,
207 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
885 (1953); United States v. Bell, 126 F. Supp. 612
(D.D.C 1955) (non-capital case).
40 See note 27 supra.
41 See, e.g., United States v. Peltz, 18 F.R.D. 394
(S.D.N.Y. 1955).
4
2Cf. Application of Tune, 230 F. 2d 883 (3d
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 907 (1955).
41UnitedStates v. Pdlz, 18 F.R.D. 394 (S.D.N.Y.
1955).
Federal Rule 17(c). This rule"4 was designed
to expedite the conduct of the trial by enabling
the defendant to obtain certain subpoenaed
documents before the trial.45 Since the materials
designated in the subpoena must be produced
prior to trial or prior to the time they are to be
offered into evidence, counsel have attempted
to invoke this provision in order to obtain in-
spection of an accused's confession. 4 Although
some courts have suggested that inspection
could be obtained under 17(c), 47 those courts
which have ruled upon the question have uni-
formly denied such requests. These courts have
relied upon the case of United States v. Bowman
Dairy Co. 48 in which the United States Supreme
Court held that rule 17(c) is not a discovery
device.
Although the Bowman Dairy case did not
involve the question of the discovery of con-
4 A subpoena may also command the person to
whom it is directed to produce the books, papers,
documents or other objects designated therein. The
court on motion made promptly may quash or
modify the subpoena if compliance would be un-
reasonable or oppressive. The court may direct
that books, papers, documents or objects designated
in the subpoena be produced before the court at a
time prior to the trial or prior to the time when
they are to be offered in evidence and may upon
their production permit the books, papers, docu-
ments or objects or portions thereof to be inspected
by the parties and their attorney. Fn. R. Cnmr
P. 17(c).
11 United States v. Bowman Dairy Co., 341 U.S.
214 (1951). But see, United States v. Gogel, 19 F.R.D.
107 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (inspection of the defendant's
sixteen page confession denied on the ground that
the trial would not be unreasonably delayed by
giving the defendant time to inspect the documents
at the time of its introduction into evidence).
46 United States v. Gogel, 19 F.R.D. 107 (S.D.N.Y.
1956); United States v. Louie Gin Hall, 18 F.R.D.
384 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); United States v. Kiamie, 18
F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
-In Monroe v. United States, 234 F.2d 49 (D.C.-
Cir. 1956), the court indicated that the defendant
might have been allowed to inspect tape recordings,
analogous to a confession, under rule 17(c). See
also United States v. Carter, 15 F.R.D. 367 (D.D.C.
1954).
40341 U.S. 214 (1951).
[Vol. 48
CRIMINAL LAW CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS
fessions,? the Court indicated that those docu-
ments which may be examined under the dis-
covery provision of rule 16 may in addition,
be subpoenaed under rule 17(c) if the purpose
is to secure documents that the moving party
might reasonably introduce into evidence.0
However, since a confession is ordinarily damag-
ing or impeaching, its use at the trial by the
defendant is unlikely.51 Consequently, it has
been held that such a statement is not a docu-
ment that might reasonably be offered into evi-
dence by the accused, and for this reason dis-
covery of confessions under rule 17(c) has been
generally denied,
Courts have nevertheless implied that, were
the documents sought neither damaging nor
impeaching, inspection might be granted. How-
ever, if the "confession" supported the testi-
mony of the accused, the defendant obviously
would want to use it at the trial but such use
would be barred as self-serving statements,3
It is apparent, therefore, that rule 17(c) is not
a discovery device and that inspection should
neither be sought nor granted under that rule.
Some courts have overlooked the evidentiary
requirements and indicated that discovery is
obtainable under rule 17(c).51 However, these
courts have construed rule 17(c) as requiring
for its application a showing of good cause and
have denied discovery for failure to satisfy this
requirement.5 5 It seems unnecessary for courts
IOThe defendant was not seeking discovery of
his confession but sought to inspect voluntary
statements made by third persons to the govern-
ment.
- See note 48 supra.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
3 6 WrmsoMR, EVIDENCE §§ 815, 1766 (3d ed.
1940); McCoRmCK, EvLE'Wc § 275 (1954).
, See United States v. Scully, 15 F.R.D. 402
(S.D.N.Y. 1954); United States v. Carter, 15 F.R.D.
367 (D.D.C. 1954).
51 In United States v. Scdlly, 15 F.R.D. 402
(S.D.N.Y. 1954), it was indicated that the mere
allegation that the defendant cannot remember the
statements was not a showing of good cause unless
there had been a long passage of time to dim his
recollection. The requirements of good cause are
satisfied if: (1) the documents sought are eviden-
tiary and revelant, (2) the defense after a diligent
to impose the requirements of good cause when
such disclosure is sought under this rule since
a confession does not meet the expressed evi-
dentiary requirement of the rule. This conclu-
sion appears proper when it is considered that
rule 17(c), unlike rule 16, was not intended to
provide an additional method of discovery.56 In
addition, the suggestion that a federal court has
the inherent common law power, irrespective of
the federal rules, to grant pre-trial inspection
would support the conclusion that only rule 16,
which was intended to restate the common law
procedure, should be utilized for discovery
purposes.5 Moreover, since a proper construc-
tion of rule 16 would empower the court, in its
discretion, to permit an accused pre-trial in-
spection of his confession, a similar construction
of rule 17(c) would be an unnecessary dupli-
cation. s
INSPECTION UNDER STATE STATUTES
Several states have enacted statutes regulat-
ing discovery in criminal cases.5D Some expressly
investigation must be unable to procure the state-
ment in advance of the trial, (3) the documents
are of such a nature that the defendant will be
unable to prepare a proper defense without pre-
trial inspection and failure to obtain such inspection
may tend unreasonably to delay the trial; and (4)
the motion to inspect must not be a fishing expedi
tion. United States v. lVinkler, 17 F.R.D. 213 (D.
Rhode Is. 1955); United States v. Ward, 120 F.
Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); United States v. lozia,
13 F.R.D. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
G United States v. Bowman Dairy Co., 341 U.S.
214 (1951).
37 Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838 (8th Cir.
1949).
Whether under existing law discovery may be
permitted in criminal cases is doubtful, .. .The
courts have, however made orders granting to the
defendant an opportunity to inspect impounded
documents belonging to him,....The rule is a
restatement of this procedure .... Note of Ad-
visory Committe, 18 U.S.C. following FED. R.
CRn. P. 16.
See United States v. Rosen fdd, 57 F.2d 74 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 556 (1932).
2 See Note, 67 H.ARv. L. Rnv. 492 (1954).
5 The court... may,... compel the production
of any written document, or any other thing which
